A Dialogue on Republicanism by Mantzavinos, C.
 
 
A Dialogue on Republicanism 
 
C. Mantzavinos 
in: Revue de Philosophie Économique, (forthcoming 2021) 
 
Abstract 
Two interlocutors, Philip Pettit and a student, are exchanging views on liberal political 
and economic philosophy during lunch at Prospect House, the faculty club of Princeton. 
The dialogue begins with clarifications of the notion of liberty, and, against objections of 
the student, Pettit introduces and defends his own conception of freedom as non-
domination rather than as non-interference. It proceeds with an exchange of arguments 
regarding the different kinds of institutional settings that entrench liberty and all the other 
things valued by humans. The interlocutors reach a preliminary consensus that in order to 
substantiate the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination in concrete institutional 
realities, two things are required: the establishment of a mixed constitution – so that no 
single, unconstrained body can exercise lawmaking and other government functions – as 
well as eternal vigilance on the part of the citizens. The second part of the dialogue deals 
with a major challenge to the republican political philosophy expressed by the student: 




(Philip Pettit's views are drawn freely from his following publications: Republicanism. A 
Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997; A Theory 
of Freedom. From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2001; (with Geoffrey Brennan): The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political 
Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004; (with Christian List): Group Agency: 
The Possibility, Design and Status of Corporate Agents, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011; On the People's Terms. A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012; Just Freedom A Moral Compass for a 
Complex World, New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2014. When Philip Pettit or the 
student are quoting or discussing views from other authors, then an endnote with the 





PETTIT: Are we heading for the Prospect House? 
STUDENT: Yes, that would be nice. Is this the faculty club? 
PETTIT: Yes, this is where Princeton faculty take their guests – there are not many 
options around really, so I have booked a table in the Garden Room there. I hope you will 
like it. 
STUDENT: I am sure, I will. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
JOHN GOICURIA: Hello, I have your reservation. Lunch for two, is that right? 
PETTIT: Yes, John. Thank you. Tell me, can we have by any chance the President's 
table? I think he is not on campus. 
JOHN GOICURIA: Yes, sure. Here we are. 
PETTIT: Thank you very much. You can take the seat overlooking the garden. 
STUDENT: It is very nice here. 
PETTIT: So, what have you been up to since you have arrived at Princeton? 
STUDENT: I have had a look on the campus and went to the library. This has been quite 
impressive. Everything is very quiet here. And where there is not a lot of action, there is a 
lot of thinking. 
PETTIT: And, have you been able to do a lot of thinking yourself? 
STUDENT: I was mainly thinking about a performance that I happened to see in the 
theater, here on campus. 
PETTIT: Which play did you see? 
STUDENT: This was Henrik Ibsen's play A Doll's House and it was by a Danish group 
who staged it very close to the original production in late 1879, in the Royal Theater in 





PETTIT: The play took Denmark and Europe by storm by then and established Ibsen's 
enduring reputation as one of the world's great dramatists. 
STUDENT: No wonder that it has been so successful since it raises many important 
questions. 
PETTIT: Like any good piece of theater does, but I find it fascinating for the question it 
raises about the meaning of freedom in particular. 
STUDENT: I guess you mean with respect to the relationship between the protagonists in 
the play, Torvald, this young and successful banker, and his wife Nora. 
PETTIT: Under nineteenth-century law Torvald has enormous power over how his wife 
can act, but he dotes on her and denies her nothing – nothing, at least, within the accepted 
parameters of life as a banker's wife. True, he bans the macarons for which she has a 
particular taste. But even that denial is not much of a restriction, since she can hide the 
macarons in her skirts. When it comes to the ordinary doings of everyday life, then, Nora 
has carte blanche. She has all the latitude that a woman in late nineteenth-century Europe 
could have wished for. 
STUDENT: So, Nora enjoys many benefits that anyone might envy. 
PETTIT: But does she enjoy freedom? In particular, does she enjoy freedom in her 
relationship with Torvald? 
STUDENT: His hands-off treatment means that he does not interfere with her, as political 
philosophers say. 
PETTIT: He does not put any prohibitions or penalties in the way of her choices, nor 
does he manipulate or deceive her in her exercise of those choices. But is this enough to 
allow us to think of Nora as a free agent? 
STUDENT: If freedom consists in noninterference, as a series of philosophers hold, we 





PETTIT: But I suspect that like me, you will balk at this judgment. You will think that 
Nora lives under Torvald's thumb. She is the doll in the doll's house, not a free woman. 
STUDENT: I am not sure whether I would balk at this judgment. It all depends on the 
conception of freedom that one is willing to adopt. 
PETTIT: My own conception of freedom as a person requires more than just being let 
alone, just benefiting from noninterference; it requires richer assets than any that Nora 
enjoys. To be a free person you must have the capacity to make certain central choices – 
choices about what religion to practice, whether to speak your mind, who to associate 
with, and so on – without having to seek the permission of another. You must be able to 
exercise such basic or fundamental liberties, as they are usually called, without having to 
answer any master or dominus in your life. 
STUDENT: I think this juxtaposition to slavery is very helpful. Man, or at least European 
man, seems to enter history divided into free and unfree. 
PETTIT: Freedom in this sense requires the absence not just of interference, but of the 
subjection to another that was known at the time of the Roman republic as dominatio or 
domination
1
. The absence of interference that Nora enjoys is not enough for freedom in 
this sense, since it only comes about by Torvald's grace and favor. In order to enjoy 
freedom you must have the ability to avoid interference even if others take against you, 
and this is precisely what Nora lacks. If Torvald took against her and withdrew his 
goodwill, then she would no longer enjoy noninterference at his hands. Thus, as things 
stand, she is indebted to him for the latitude of choice that she enjoys. She is subject to 
his will, by virtue of his legal and cultural power, and it is only her good fortune, not the 
status of being a free woman, that explains why she escapes his intrusion in her life. What 
Nora needs, if she is to be truly free, is not just the absence of interference, then, but the 
absence of domination: that is, the absence of subjection to the will of others, in 
particular Torvald's will. 
STUDENT: Kant had already clearly seen this when he noted: "Find himself in what 
condition he will, the human being is dependent on many external things […]. But what 









PETTIT: This tradition can be traced back at least to the liber of Roman thought, rather 
than to Kant. The liber was someone who lived in his own domain – the masculine form 
fits with the habits of the time – on terms that he himself set. Within that domination he 
lived sui juris, as it was put in Roman law, 'under his own jurisdiction'. He did not 
operate in potestate domini, 'in the power of a master', and he did not have to make his 
choices cum permissu, 'with permission'. He could act without fear or deference, being 
protected and empowered in relation to others, and even in relation to the very law that 
helped establish his position. 
STUDENT: So, your conception of freedom goes back to the Roman times. It does not 
lay any claim to novelty then? 
PETTIT: My general stance is that the existence of a historical pedigree for an approach 
taken in political philosophy is bound to give the approach more intellectual plausibility. 
How likely is it, after all, that any one of us would discover afresh a wholly novel idea for 
political life? 
STUDENT: The distinction made popular by Isaiah Berlin between negative and positive 
liberty is very helpful in this context. "I am normally said to be free to the degree to 
which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. […] If I am prevented by 
others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is 
contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, 
or, it may be, enslaved"
3
. This notion of negative freedom conceptualizes liberty as non-
interference. Berlin thought that "whatever the principle in terms of which the area of 
non-interference is to be drawn, whether it is that of natural law or natural rights, or of 
utility, or the pronouncements of a categorical imperative, or the sanctity of the social 
contract, or any other concept which men have sought to clarify and justify their 
convictions, liberty in this sense means liberty from; absence of interference beyond the 







"The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the 
individual to be his own master", according to Berlin: "I wish my life and decisions to 
depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of 
my own, not of other men's acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved 
by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as 
it were, from outside"
5
. 
PETTIT: Although Berlin's distinction between positive and negative liberty is useful, 
my point is that non-domination and non-interference are distinct issues, and that liberty 
as an ideal in politics should be understood as non-domination. 
STUDENT: Nora's example was supposed to show this, I know, but there are many more 
meanings of "liberty" that have entered moral and political philosophy over the centuries. 
PETTIT: Yes, of course, there are – nobody denies that. 
STUDENT: "Inner freedom" is a very popular notion. The concept of "inner liberty" has 
been juxtaposed to liberty in the sense of absence of coercion by the medieval Scholastics 
for example. They have distinguished between libertas a necessitate and libertas a 
coactione. 
PETTIT: "Inner freedom" normally refers to the extent to which a person is guided in his 
actions not by passions, desires or momentary impulses, but by his considered will. By 
his intellect or reason which can oversee the emotions, tame the passions and overcome 
his moral or intellectual weakness. 
STUDENT: This kind of rational control of the soul has certainly been important in many 
ethical writings – its immediate appeal rests on a fundamentally simple and erroneous 
psychological view: on the one side is reason, sitting on its throne, on the other the 
passions, always contesting it. When the throne is usurped, "inner freedom" is 
endangered; when the counter-revolution of reason succeeds, the warm deontological 
security of "inner freedom" establishes itself again. The soul is the scene of a theatre that 





But "inner freedom" has also served as the title of another, similar, but different play. 
When there are forces beyond my control, forces in my natural and social environment 
that is, which surpass me and which can crush me without me having any chance to react 
– what can I do then? I can only turn to inner emigration. I might be a slave, as Epictetus 
was, and still feel free, because I have been able to liberate myself from my desires that I 
know I cannot realize – by entirely eliminating them or at least entirely control them: 
"τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν μὲν ὑπόληψις, ὁρμή, 
ὄρεξις, ἔκκλισις καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ ὅσα ἡμέτερα ἔργα: οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ σῶμα, ἡ κτῆσις, 
δόξαι, ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ ὅσα οὐχ ἡμέτερα ἔργα. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστι φύσει 




PETTIT: One could label this play, following Berlin, "the retreat to the inner citadel". 
But even this notion of inner freedom is not a useful one for the purposes of establishing 
a free polity. 
STUDENT: Let us agree, then, that "inner freedom" is not the ideal according to which 
the institutions of a polity should be designed. 
PETTIT: Yes, this concept cannot serve as a useful ideal for political praxis. 
STUDENT: Another meaning of liberty that is often prevailing in philosophical 
discussions is liberty as the power to satisfy our wishes or the extent of the options 
among which you can choose. In these discussions liberty is conceptualized very close to 
power to enact whatever wishes or preferences you have. It can also be phrased in a 
choice-theoretic framework, as having the ability – using the necessary personal, natural 
and social resources – to choose whichever option you value most. This freedom comes 
close to omnipotence, I think, and is certainly distinct from "absence of coercion from 
other men", which is the only feasible ideal in politics. 
PETTIT: Although I am in agreement with you that freedom is recognizably different 
from omnipotence, I would not reject the choice-theoretic framework as a useful guide to 
construct a workable political philosophy of freedom. Here is a formula that might be 





that: 1. you have the room and the resources to enact the option you prefer, 2. whatever 
your own preferences over those options, and 3. whatever the preference of any other as 
to how you should choose. 
STUDENT: I think it is prudent to restrict the usage of the concept of liberty for the 
purposes of political philosophy to the influences on human action that come from other 
men. Your proposal seems to be close to Russell's definition rephrased in a choice-
theoretic framework: "Freedom in general may be defined as the absence of obstacles to 
the realization of desires. Complete freedom is thus only possible for omnipotence"
7
. 
PETTIT: This is a primitive mistake that you accuse me of doing – I would never hold 
such a definition as defensible, of course! Neither has been a charitable interpretation of 
Russell; he had distinguished between "political liberty as one species of a genus" from 
"freedom in general" that you have quoted. The core of the matter is domination as I was 
telling you before, and domination can be fruitfully connected to choice, I suggest. 
Insofar, let me gloss it otherwise, so that the relationship of domination becomes crystal 
clear: Someone has dominating power over another, someone dominates or subjugates 
another, to the extent that 1. one has the capacity to interfere 2. on an arbitrary basis 3. in 
certain choices that the other is in a position to make.  
STUDENT: I would certainly not oppose this clarification as long as freedom is kept 
distinct from power, or even more, omnipotence. 
PETTIT: Let us agree that freedom and power are not to be used interchangeably, as long 
as we consent to use freedom as the absence of the capacity of a second or third party to 
interfere arbitrarily on certain choices that one is in a position to make. 
STUDENT: Be that as it may, as long as we consent that we do not want to honor 
positions like that of Dewey that "liberty is power, effective power to do specific things" 
and that the "demand of liberty is the demand for power"
8
. 
PETTIT: There is a connection between liberty and power, I would not deny this, but the 





STUDENT: My fear is that if freedom is understood as power, then this would inevitably 
lead to the identification of liberty with wealth. Any kind and extent of wealth 
redistribution by a political authority can then be justified on the grounds that it increases 
liberty. But even though wealth and liberty can be both desirable, they are nevertheless 
different. I can be a poor peasant, but still a free man. And I can be a wealthy courtier 
living in the lap of luxury, but still a servant.
9
 
PETTIT: If you are impoverished – if you lack the resources to function adequately in 
your society
10
 – then you are likely to live in fear of how the rich and powerful will treat 
you, should you speak your mind frankly or exercise no caution about whom you 
associate with. 
STUDENT: Yes, if you are poor, you are likely to live in fear of how the rich and 
powerful will treat you, but it is important to recognize "that we may be free and yet 
miserable. Liberty does not mean all good things or the absence of all evils. It is true that 




PETTIT: Freedom as non-domination is not the only good in life, of course. But it is a 
gateway good, as we might put it: a good whose realization promises to bring the 
realization of other goods in its train. If we look after freedom as non-domination in the 
context of domestic regulation and government, guarding against people's dependency on 
others in areas of properly personal choice, then we will also have to look after goods 
such as social, medical, and judicial security, domestic and workplace respect, and, more 
generally, a functioning legal and economic order. If we pay the admission price for 
freedom, then we will have paid enough to ensure access to those other more specific 
values as well. 
STUDENT: Let me recapitulate. You put a lot of emphasis on the definition of liberty as 
non-domination rather than as non-interference, accusing many authors in the liberal 
tradition that they impermissibly failed to honor this distinction. Trying to structure our 
discussion on the proper definition of liberty, I suggested to follow the useful distinction 





discussed and rejected the concept of "inner liberty" as a useful ideal for the purposes of 
political philosophy. We then seemed to agree that equating freedom with power or 
omnipotence would be inappropriate. Finally, I suggested that freedom and wealth be 
used in distinctive way and at this point, I feel that a disagreement between us is starting 
smoothly to take shape. 
PETTIT: Because I want to grant freedom the status of a gateway good, as I said. 
STUDENT: You certainly need argue further in order to convince me on that. Please 
allow me to quote again Berlin on that: "Liberty is not the only goal of men. I can, like 
the Russian critic Belinsky, say that if others are to be deprived of it – if my brothers are 
to remain in poverty, squalor and chains – then I do not want it for myself, I reject it with 
both hands and infinitely prefer to share their fate. But nothing is gained by a confusion 
of terms. To avoid glaring inequality or widespread misery I am ready to sacrifice some, 
or all, of my freedom: I may do so willingly and freely; but it is freedom that I am giving 
up for the sake of justice or equality or the love of my fellow men. I should be guilt-
stricken and rightly so, if I were not, in some circumstances, ready to make this sacrifice. 
But a sacrifice is not an increase in what is being sacrificed, namely freedom, however 
great the moral need or the compensation for it. Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, 
not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience."
12
 
PETTIT: I disagree. I do not deny the existence of a variety of values, of course. Nor am 
I a defender of a confusion of terms. But I want to argue that the conception of freedom 
as non-domination allows us to see at least all issues of justice as issues, ultimately, of 
what freedom demands: what it demands in our social relations with one another, in our 
political relations to our government, and in the relations between the different societies 
on earth. I want to build an overall political philosophy on the foundation of freedom as 
non-domination and I think that this has natural ecumenical attractions. John Keats wrote, 
with some licence, that the sum of all required knowledge – all we know and all we need 
to know – is contained in the line "Beautry is truth, truth beauty". My refrain to put it in 





STUDENT: Listen, it seems that we have now really reached the point that many 
philosophical exchanges reach: we disagree on the appropriate use of terms. When such a 
point is reached, I find that a conceptual analysis would be a sterile enterprise: what 
would we gain, if we would proceed with a further analysis of the concept of liberty and 
the other concepts used in political life, like justice, prosperity, equality or fairness? 
PETTIT: Conceptual clarity. 
STUDENT: If this were feasible. But how much further should we pursue the struggle 
with the meaning of terms, even if they are so important, given their many uses in 
different contexts and in different historical epochs? 
PETTIT: What is freedom? What is justice? – answering these kinds of questions has 
traditionally been considered as the central task of philosophy. 
STUDENT: In order for the results of philosophy to become substantial and important, 
one should stop asking "What is X?"- questions altogether or at least whenever a 
stubborn disagreement emerges, as in our case. This is the radical path that I favor. For, 
what kind of answers can we get when we ask such a question? We cannot get to the 
essences of things. We cannot provide necessary and sufficient conditions of the 
respective concept, either. And the descriptions of the use of the respective concept in 
different contexts will just give us some information about the meaning of "X", quite a 
trivial result really. So, here is my suggestion: instead of debating further on the meaning 
of "freedom", let us turn to an analysis and evaluation of different kinds of institutional 
settings that entrench liberty and all the other things that humans value. 
PETTIT: Providing answers to "What is X?" questions will always remain an important 
philosophical task, I think. If philosophers will not care for conceptual clarity, whom do 
we expect to care about this task? But I want to honor your concerns and take up your 
suggestion; we can turn our attention to the institutional reality now. Freedom as non-
domination is an institutional reality in the sense that it is constituted, not caused to exist, 





Remember the argument, eg in Just Freedom, that because of the context-sensitive nature 
of the usage of ‘is free’, there is  no semantically right account; and that as between 
different accounts that stay reasonably faithful to usage, the choice is to be made onn the 
basis of reflective equilibrium. 
STUDENT: What exactly do you have in mind? Do not institutions relate in a standard 
cause-effect fashion to the non-domination that they help to bring about? 
PETTIT: No. Institutions will constitute, or help to constitute, the very non-domination 
which citizens enjoy under them. In other words non-domination comes into existence 
simultaneously with the appearance of the appropriate institutions; it represents the 
reality of those institutions in the person of the individual. 
STUDENT: This sounds a bit mysterious to me… 
PETTIT: The presence of certain antibodies in your blood makes it the case that you are 
immune to a certain disease, but it does not cause your immunity, as if the immunity were 
something separate on which we had to wait; the presence of those antibodies constitutes 
the immunity, as we say. By analogy, the presence in the polity of such and such 
empowering and protective arrangements makes it the case that you are more or less 
immune to arbitrary interference, but it does not cause that immunity; it constitutes it. To 
be immune to a certain disease is to have antibodies in your blood – maybe these, maybe 
those – which prevent the development of the relevant virus. The presence of the 
antibodies represents a way of realizing the immunity; it is not something that causally 
leads to it. To be immune to arbitrary interference, to enjoy non-domination, is to have 
inhibitors present in your society – maybe these, maybe those – which prevent arbitrary 
interference in your life and affairs. And the presence of suitable inhibitors – suitable 
institutions and arrangements – represents a way of realizing your non-domination; it is 
not something that leads by a causal path to that non-domination. 
STUDENT: But if freedom as non-domination is an institutional reality in the sense that 
you explained, this is an ominous feature really. If freedom is conceived of as something 
that the state constitutes or helps to constitute, then how can it represent a criterion by 





PETTIT: That is nonsense. Freedom as non-domination is an institutional reality in the 
sense that it is constituted, not caused to exist, by the institutional arrangements that put it 
in place. But we can still compare the freedom as non-domination that different sets of 
institutions may constitute, and we can still find that one set does better than the other in 
respect of such freedom: we can do this in just the way as we could compare the kinds 
and levels of immunity against a certain disease that different sorts of antibody might 
conceivably provide.  
STUDENT: Let me grant for the moment that the relationship is constitutive rather than 
causal, although, frankly, I do not expect that anything substantial hinges on that. The 
more important question is why pursuing the value of freedom as non-domination should 
be a political concern for the state to advance. Even if you accused me of speaking non-
sense a minute ago, I still regard you as a friend. We all know that friendship is a great 
value in human life, but none of us believes that the state should give itself the task of 
furthering friendship. Why is freedom as non-domination different in this respect? 
PETTIT: Unlike friendship, freedom satisfies two crucial conditions, one negative, the 
other positive. It is not something that individuals can satisfactorily pursue by private, 
decentralized means and it is something that the state is able to pursue fairly effectively. 
STUDENT: The fulfillment of the negative condition seems pretty obvious. In a situation 
where exclusively individuals relying on their own private efforts strive for non-
domination the outcome will be likely a very unequal distribution of non-domination. 
People will have to devote their skills and energy either in productive activities or in 
defending themselves from the domination of others. Such a situation would be less 
desirable to every individual vis à vis the situation in which a constitutional authority 
undertakes the task of protecting all individuals from the blind exertion of a strategy of 
reciprocal power. A minimal constitutional provision of establishing a third party 
entrusted with the enforcement of some rules of peaceful coexistence will be in the 
interest of every individual in a society
13
. 
PETTIT: Yes, political theory has convincingly shown this, I think – in effect that 





STUDENT: The question remains whether the state is able to pursue non-domination 
effectively. The fundamental doubt of political theory is: Quis custodiet custodes? Who 
will guard against the guardians? 
PETTIT: This doubt can be mitigated, if not completely extinguished, when the state 
follows the republican ideal of acting as the undominating defender of its citizens' 
freedom as non-domination. 
STUDENT: And how can this be accomplished? Experience teaches us that a 
government and state continuously fail to be satisfactory. 
PETTIT: There are three ways in which a government and state fail to be satisfactory
14
. It 
might fail to operate impartially by systematically favouring members of a particular 
grouping, like a family or tribe. It might operate impartially but fail to operate according 
to established, stable rules in decision-making; that is it might be ad hoc or capricious, 
rather than constitutional. Or it might operate impartially and constitutionally, but fail to 
accommodate to its subjects. The first danger introduces partial, as distinct from 
impartial, rule; the second particularistic rule, as distinct from constitutional rule – the 
rule of law; and the third paternalistic rule, rather than accountable rule. Now, the 
republicanism that I propose, endorses the mixture of the mixed constitution meant to 
ensure impartial rule, the constitutionalism of the mixed constitution meant to ensure 
constitutional rule and it encourages the contestatory character of the citizenry to ensure 
accountable rule. 
STUDENT: Let us work through these provisos which are supposed to ensure freedom as 
non-domination in a republican polity. When we say that the republic is to secure 
freedom of its citizens by satisfying a range of constitutional constraints associated 
broadly with the mixed constitution, which constraints do we refer to? 
PETTIT: The mixed constitution was meant to guarantee a rule of law – a constitutional 
order – under which each citizen would be equal with others and a separation and sharing 
of powers – a mixed order – that would deny control over the law to any one individual 
or body. Polybius was a Greek who spent many years in Rome, first as a hostage and then 





history of Rome that highlighted what he saw as the glory of the Roman republic. Rome 
gave citizens freedom in relation to the power or dominium of private masters insofar as 
the law afforded equal and adequate protection for each. And Rome gave citizens 
freedom in relation to the law itself – to the public power or imperium at the origin of law 
– insofar as it ensured that the law reflected the shared wishes of the citizenry. 
Polybius was particularly effusive about the control over the shaping of law that the 
Roman constitution gave the citizenry. The power to form, enact and administer Roman 
law was put in the hands of mutually checking, popularly representative bodies and 
officials. This power materialized in an arrangement Polybius called a mixed 
constitution. The arrangement was constitutional insofar as public, impartial law 
governed it; and it was mixed insofar as it gave power to all sectors of society. 
STUDENT: However, "isonomia", that is equality of laws to all manner of persons was 
an ideal already known and strived for in Ancient Athens. Solon established isonomia in 
Athens when he gave the people the certainty of being governed according to known 
rules. What Solon did was to enact the set of rules as instructions to the officials in order 
to control their administrative action. The major step was to treat the officials as the 
servants of the law, which was written and publicly accessible by all and was no longer 
bound to an unwritten tradition but superseded it. This established the operation of the 
Greek conception of the rule of law, implicitly founded a constitutional scheme based on 
its sovereignty and effectively constrained officials and their decisions.
15
 
PETTIT: Be that as it may, the main figure in Renaissance Republicanism was surely 
Niccolò Machiavelli who in his Discourses on Livy, published in 1531, like earlier 
Roman authors, hailed civic freedom, the freedom as non-domination enjoyed by the 
citizens of a republic, as the signature ideal. He argued in particular for a constitution that 
allowed ordinary citizens to contest government in the way the Roman plebeians had 
continually contested the proposals and decisions of their rulers, whether in popular 
elections or demonstrations, via their tribunes or in the courts. And republican ideas were 
incorporated into the enormously influential work of Baron de Montesquieu on The Spirit 






STUDENT: I know, there is a glorious history to this set of ideas, and I can see how the 
appropriate constitutional provisions can secure freedom. Government must be carried 
out by means of an empire of law; the powers recognized under that law must be 
dispersed across different individuals and bodies; and the more basic and important laws 
must not be subject to straightforward majoritarian amendment. But still, however well 
designed any system of law will leave considerable power in the hands of officials, be it 
judges, members of parliaments or of the executive. How is it possible to rule out 
decision-making on an arbitrary basis among legislators, administrators and judges? 
PETTIT: There are two immediate answers to your question, an influential, but wrong 
one and a less popular, but correct one. 
STUDENT: Let me guess the most influential one: consent. 
PETTIT: Exactly. 
STUDENT: There is a long tradition arguing in favor of consent, explicit or implicit, as 
the main means of securing non-arbitrariness in politics
16
. 
PETTIT: If explicit individual consent is required for non-arbitrariness, especially if the 
consent has to be unforced, then non-arbitrariness in public decisions becomes an 
inaccessible ideal. If implicit individual consent is thought to be enough, however, and an 
absence or protest is taken as evidence of implicit consent, then non-arbitrariness in 
public decisions becomes an ideal that is so accessible as to be empty: any decision that 
fails to drive me to the barricades will count as non-arbitrary from my point of view. 
STUDENT: David Hume has given the definite counterargument to implicit or tacit 
consent in his Of the Original Contract: 
"Should it be said, that, by living under the dominion of a prince, which one might leave, 
every individual has given a tacit consent to his authority, and promised his obedience; it 
may be answered that such an implicit consent can only have place, where a man 
imagines, that the matter depends on his choice. But where he thinks (as all mankind do 





certain prince or certain form of government; it would be absurd to infer a consent or 
choice, which he expressly, in this case, renounces and disclaims. 
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artizan has a free choice to leave his country, 
when he knows no foreign languages or manners, and lives from day to day, by the small 
wages he acquires? We may as well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely 
consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and 
must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her"
17
. 
PETTIT: Very nice! 
STUDENT: So, if consent will not do, what is the alternative? 
PETTIT: Contestability. What is required for non-arbitrariness in the exercise of a certain 
power is not actual consent to that sort of power but the permanent possibility of 
effectively contesting it. 
STUDENT: Is this your answer to the question what makes it possible for a public 
decision not to have the aspect of an arbitrary act of interference? 
PETTIT: Yes. The public decision may materialize, like most public decisions, on a basis 
that is consensual only in a vanishingly weak sense. That does not matter, provided that it 
materializes under a dispensation of effective contestability. The non-arbitrariness of 
public decisions comes of their meeting, not the condition of having originated or 
emerged according to some consensual process, but the condition of being such that if 
they conflict with the perceived interests and ideas of the citizens, then the citizens can 
effectively contest them. What matters is not the historical origin of the decisions in some 
form of consent, but their modal or counterfactual responsiveness to the possibility of 
contestation. 
STUDENT: The issue is, of course: how can contestation be effectively institutionalized 
in a polity? 
PETTIT: The contestability of public decision-making can be institutionalized within an 





STUDENT: But democracy is normally connected with consent. It is normally 
connected, that is, with the popular election of the personnel in government. 
PETTIT: My suggestion is that democracy be understood on a model that is primarily 
contestatory rather than consensual. On this model, a government will be democratic, a 
government will represent a form of rule that is controlled by the people, to the extent 




STUDENT: This needs elaboration – it is not clear to me. 
PETTIT: Consider an analogy. Whatever existentialists may have thought, individual 
autonomy or self-rule cannot conceivably require that people should have considered and 
endorsed each of their particular beliefs and desires in a historical process of self-
construction; if it did, then no one would be autonomous. What it requires, more 
plausibly, is that people are capable of exposing each of their beliefs and desires to 
appropriate tests, especially in the event of problems arising, and whether or not they 
maintain such a commitment depends on how it fares in the tests. The index of individual 
autonomy is modal or counterfactual, not historical. People are autonomous in virtue of 
what can be – in virtue of what they can do in checking their beliefs and desires – not in 
virtue of what has been: not in virtue of a record of self-checking and self-construction. 
Democracy refers us, at least etymologically, to the self-rule of the people. And as 
individual self-rule or autonomy can be modelled in a modal rather than a historical way, 
so plausibly can the self-rule of a people be modelled in that way. The self-ruling 
individual may run on automatic pilot much of the time, acting on beliefs and desires that 
originate in forgotten times and pressures. What makes them self-ruling is the fact that 
they are never just the victim of those beliefs and desires: they are able to examine them 
at will and, depending on how the examination goes, able to maintain or amend them. By 
analogy, the self-ruling demos or people may also often run on automatic pilot, allowing 
public decision-making to materialize under more or less unexamined routines. What 
makes them self-ruling or democratic is the fact that they are not exposed willy-nilly to 





contestation establishes a mismatch with their relevant interests or opinions, able to force 
an amendment. 
STUDENT: This is an interesting analogy, but you remain vague on what exactly 
democratic contestability requires in order to be institutionally embedded. 
PETTIT: In order for public decision-making to be contestable, there are at least three 
general preconditions that have to be satisfied. The first is that decision-making is 
conducted in such a way that there is a potential basis for contestation. The second is that 
not only is there a potential basis for contestation, there is also a channel or voice 
available by which decisions may be contested. And the third is that not only is there a 
basis and a channel for contestation, there is a suitable forum in existence for hearing 
contestations: a forum where the validity of the claim is assessed and a suitable response 
determined. 
STUDENT: So, I suppose the requirement of the existence of a suitable forum for 
hearing contestations goes hand in hand with debate-based decision making as it is 
envisioned by a series of contemporary democratic theoritsts favoring a model of 
deliberative democracy. 
PETTIT: Exactly. In concrete terms, it would mean that at every site of decision-making, 
legislative, administrative, and judicial, there are procedures in place which identify the 
considerations relevant to the decision, thereby enabling citizens to raise the question as 
to whether they are the appropriate considerations to play that role. And it would mean 
that there are procedures in place which enable citizens to make a judgment on whether 
the relevant considerations actually determined the outcome: the decisions must be made 
under transparency, under threat of scrutiny, under freedom of information, and so on. 
STUDENT: This ideal of deliberative decision making seems to make contact with the 
ideal of a "republic of reasons" that Cass Sunstein finds in the American founders and 
defends in his own right
19
. 
PETTIT: Yes, according to Sunstein the traditional republican vision, in particular the 





citizens have equal claims and powers, public matters are decided by deliberation on the 
basis of considerations that have common appeal – they are not biased in favor of any 
group, or even in favor of the status quo – and agreement serves as a regulative ideal as to 
how things should be decided; the vision in a word is that of a deliberative democracy. 
And I want to mention also the arguments of my friend Quentin Skinner to the effect that 
one of the central themes of the classical and Renaissance humanism in which republican 
ideas were nurtured was a belief in dialogical reason: "our watchword ought to be audi 
alteram partem, always listen to the other side"
20
. 
STUDENT: And do you have a criterion with the help of which your whole approach is 
made more operational? 
PETTIT: In what sense? 
STUDENT: In the sense of having a yardstick at hand with the help of which I can decide 
whether a concrete institutional reality is close to the republican ideal or not? In other 
words, how much in the way of protection, infrastructure and insurance ought to be 
provided by the government in order for people to enjoy freedom as non-domination? 
PETTIT: In seeking a more concrete version of the prescription I propose that we should 
take as a guiding heuristic the image of the liber, or 'free person', in the republican 
tradition. The picture claims to represent a status in which people can all enjoy freedom 
of choice fully, and yet also enjoy it equally. 
STUDENT: This is a vague answer! 
PETTIT: No, it is an approximate answer. And here is an answer which is even closer to 
the actual: the passing of the eyeball test. It requires that people should be resourced and 
protected in the basic choices of life – for short, the basic liberties – that they can look 
others in the eye without reason for fear or deference of the kind that a power of 
interference might inspire. When you enjoy social, medical, and judicial security, and 
benefit from a suitable legal and economic order, you do not depend for your security on 
the indulgence and condescension of others. You can walk tall and assume the status of 





Suggestion: perhaps it would have been useful to introduce the basic liberties earlie: say, 
at the point I noted.  
STUDENT: The point at which people count as equals in the enjoyment of freedom as 
non-domination is an absolute one, I suppose. 
PETTIT: The eyeball test does not require that people should be able to look one another 
in the eye, regardless of their personal lack of nerve. It requires that they have this 
capacity in the absence of what would count, even by the most demanding standards of 
their society, as mere timidity or cowardice. The reference to the standards of their 
society is necessary since there is likely to be cultural variation in what counts as mere 
timidity rather than rational fear or deference. People are liable to vary across societies in 
the different levels of vulnerability to which they have become inured, in the probability 
that they assign to others becoming hostile, and in the levels of trust that they invest in 
one another. If there is cultural variation on this front, then it is clearly local standards 
that should provide the relevant benchmark for determining when fear or deference is 
irrational and when prudent; there is not going to be any universally valid alternative that 
might be invoked in their stead. 
STUDENT: So, the republican ideal is culture relative in the end. 
PETTIT: I am not a relativist, of course, but it is important to stress that the republican 
ideal is inherently dynamic and developmental. 
STUDENT: Can you be more specific? 
PETTIT: It is a commonplace that a higher performance in any domain tends to generate 
higher expectations and standards; as a community becomes generally more caring or 
polite or peaceable, we will raise our expectations and standards of care, politesse, and 
peacefulness. Suppose, then, that a society does better and better at achieving what counts 
at any time as enough to enable people to satisfy the eyeball test. As it does better in that 
respect, the local standards of what the test requires are likely to raise in tandem; as the 
society gives better protection to someone like Nora, for example, the standards for what 





ideal in any period as a feasible and useful guide to policy, we need not think that it 
points us to a steady state – just around the corner, as it were – where there is nothing else 
to be done. The ideal is, as I said, inherently dynamic and developmental. 
STUDENT: I doubt that an open-ended ideal of the kind you suggest can be very useful 
in the end. If the measure of goodness of institutions is itself changing in a non-
predetermined manner, how can it play the very role of being a measure? 
PETTIT: The republican ideal is dynamic, because there is never a final account available 
of what someone's interests are or of whether certain forms of interference – certain 
forms of state interference, in particular – are guided by ideas that they share. As people 
interact, and organize, and affirm certain identities – say, identities as women or workers 
or members of indigenous population – they are always liable to see what has been 
unquestioned, barely visible patterns in their relations with certain others as indices of a 
dominating relationship. As the notion of arbitrary power, ultimately the notion of 
domination, is developmental, so too is the complementary ideal of freedom as non-
domination. The requirements of such freedom are not fixed once for all, as on tablets of 
stone. They are subject to constant reinterpretation and review as new interests and ideas 
emerge and materialize in the society. 
STUDENT: I am not convinced, but let me pose another question now. In every regime, 
the government or at least the executive arm of government is likely to be enormously 
more powerful than any other individuals or bodies, having special access to the means of 
universal coercion. But if the government is the powerful party in the relationship 
between people and government, then how can we expect people to be able to contest the 
government effectively, as required by the republican ideal? 
PETTIT: The experience of societies over the past couple of centuries, even perhaps 
before, shows that the control of the people over the state can be grounded in a 
disposition of people to rise up in the face of a government abuse of legitimacy and a 
disposition of government to back down in response to the fact or prospect of such 





on any of the various measures, violent and non-violent, direct or indirect, individual and 
collective, that can be used to resist a regime. 
STUDENT: The experience of societies over the past couple of centuries shows the exact 
opposite: think of Stalin's Soviet Union, Mao's China and Kim's Korea. 
PETTIT: Let me phrase it like this: to the extent that the possibility of popular, successful 
resistance is on the cards – to the extent even that it is on the cards as a matter of common 
belief – the influence of the people over government can be established on a robust basis 
and can constitute a real form of power. 
STUDENT: I would challenge what you say, reminding you of Carl Schmitt's argument 
that even democratic governments fail the requirement. Even democratic governments 
are in a position to freely decide that a given case is a non-exceptional one where the rule 
of law applies or is an exceptional or emergency case where the rule of law is suspended. 
In his phrase: "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception."
21
 
PETTIT: The difficulty posed by this observation is real but not overwhelming. The 
important point to see is that popular control of government is grounded in the actual or 
perceived potential for widespread resistance – people's presumptive power of rebellion. 
STUDENT: I agree with what you say, insofar as you keep this to the normative domain: 
this is the precondition of the republical ideal to have a chance at all to materialize, but it 
is surely not empirically the case that this indeed materializes – in the vast majority of the 
historical cases, I 'd dare say. 
PETTIT: Be that as it may. Normatively at least I share the view of a series of authors on 
that point. John Locke embraced the importance of the possibility in arguing for the right 
of people to rise up against the government, should it not be fulfilling its allotted role: as 
he saw it, the role of being an impartial arbiter of disputes. In his view, as in my own 
view, the legitimacy of a government ultimately turns on whether 'the Community may be 
said in this respect to be always the Supreame Power'
22
. The people will have to be the 





Adam Ferguson, a Scottish adherent of the eighteenth-century republican creed, gave the 
idea memorable expression in describing the requirement of liberty. The liberty of the 
British people, he suggests, may be manifest in the fact that laws are formulated under 
widely accessible influence and given a widely acceptable direction. But its grounding 
goes much deeper: 'it requires a fabric no less than the whole of political constitution of 
Great Britain, a spirit no less than the refractory and turbulent zeal of this fortunate 
people, to secure it'
23
. This characteristically republican theme has a long history. It 
appears most dramatically in the idea championed in Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy 
that what enabled the citizenry of republican Rome to enjoy their freedom vis-á-vis the 
state was something that might appear at first sight to be a source of instability: the 
willingness of the plebeian poor to rise up against even the suspicion of an abuse or 
usurpation of power by the nobles. The price of liberty, in the hallowed republican 
slogan, is eternal vigilance. 
STUDENT: The price of liberty is eternal vigilance. 
PETTIT: So, in order to substantiate the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination 
in concrete institutional realities, the establishment of a mixed constitution is required - so 
that no single, unconstrained body can exercise lawmaking and other government 
functions - and eternal democratic vigilance on the part of the citizens. 
STUDENT: The way that I normally think about this is in terms of formal and informal 
institutions and their interaction. The formal institutions as the political institutions 
enforced by the state can only effectively guide the behavior of the citizens while 
interacting with the informal institutions that the members of a society have come to 
adopt in a long evolutionary process of collective learning that no single mind can 
consciously design or direct. That is why the instantiation of the republican ideal has 
certainly been an exception in human history: the spontaneous evolutionary process of 
the emergence of informal institutions that would ensure eternal democratic vigilance is a 
historical exception. 
PETTIT: It goes without saying that societies differ greatly to the extent to which the 





in a measure that reflects the extent to which two factors are in place and/or are taken as a 
matter of common belief to be in place: on the one side, the disposition of the people to 
resist perceived abuses of power by the government; and on the other, the disposition of 
those in government to be inhibited by the fact or the prospect of such resistance. These 
two factors determine how resistive a society is: how far, in reality and/or perception, the 
citizens are resistance-prone and the government resistance-averse. 
STUDENT: One could address the relationship between formal and informal institutions 
in terms of a self-enforcing constitution
24
. The institutional limits to state action laid 
down in the constitution require a sufficient number of citizens who are willing to support 
it. There is always a great range of opinions among citizens about the appropriate role of 
the state and what actions constitute a transgression of citizens' rights. The essence of the 
problem is the coordination of diverse opinions and the construction of a consensus about 
a set of state actions that trigger citizens' reactions. So, those constitutions that are 
constructed according to the principle of the rule of law need to be supported by the 
appropriate civic culture, one that both opposes government transgressions and polices 
the state in a coordinated manner
25
. This is of tremendous importance for the 
maintenance of the rule of law. 
PETTIT: If these observations are sound, then the main effect of a well-functioning 
democracy will be to make an infinite number of policies or processes unthinkable. The 
demos that keeps tabs and checks on government will mainly exercise kratos, not in 
causing this or that to be decided on, or to be decided on by this or that process, but in 
ensuring that a myriad of other policies and processes are never considered. They ride 
hard on the policies or decisions of those they elect, and on the decision-making 
processes whereby those policies are selected. They make sure that the authorities don't 
ever go off track and stand ready to blow the whistle – to make democratic trouble – if 
they do. It may have been this pattern that traditional republicans had in mind when 
endorsing the idea that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance: that is, on this 
interpretation, eternal democratic vigilance. 
STUDENT: I find your republican conception admirable in its conceptual clarity and 





in another context. But overlooking this beautiful garden on such a sunny day, my 
inclination towards consent is more likely to prevail… 
PETTIT: Flattery is the opium to the successful. The trouble with most of us is that we 
would rather be ruined by praise than saved by criticism – as the saying goes. 
STUDENT: I take it then as a challenge to be critical? 
PETTIT: This is an invitation to offer prospects of improvement, not a provocation to 
exemplify your wit. 
STUDENT: Why is freedom more important than justice, prosperity or efficiency? Or to 
phrase it differently and more systematically: I take it that you are a pluralist with respect 
to values, i.e. that you believe that there are many values that cannot be reduced to a 
single supervalue. If this is the case, then on what grounds is freedom more important 
than other values in political life? 
PETTIT: In arguing that the just state ought to promote equal freedom as non-domination 
amongst its citizens, the republican theory of justice does not suggest that freedom as 
non-domination is the only value that matters, as a utilitarian theory might argue that 
utility is the only relevant value. What it holds, however, is that if we look after the 
requirements of equal freedom as non-domination, then we will have looked after the 
requirements of many other values as well: for example the value of enjoying functioning 
capabilities. Freedom as non-domination is not the only value in politics, but it serves a 
gateway role: if we pay the price of securing freedom as non-domination in a suitable 
measure, we will have paid enough to secure social justice and political legitimacy.  
STUDENT: You have stressed earlier the character of freedom as a gateway good, a 
good whose realization promises to bring the realization of other goods in its train. I 
acknowledge that there is a natural tendency of nearly all of us to believe that all things 
we value in life must be intimately connected or at least compatible with one another. 
This is probably a manifestation of a drive to avoid cognitive dissonance, a relatively 
solid finding of empirical psychology. If all values can in the end be reduced to one, then 





seems to enable a simple and elegant axiology and to help establish a well-ordered 
harmony of values, all in one way or another inferior or subservient to the highest value. 
PETTIT: I am not a value monist, however, as you yourself mentioned before. 
STUDENT: You are not, but you sound like one! If all conflicts between values are only 
apparent, as you seem to suggest, then value pluralism becomes a harmless position: all 
options for choice can be tidily arrayed according to how much of the central value, 
freedom as non-domination, they promote or respect. An evaluative choice would in the 
end be reduced to choice between two amounts of the central value. Practical rationality 
can still be exerted, of course, but in a faint way: tragic choices or moral and political 
dilemmas have been softened to near disappearance. 
PETTIT: There is no contradiction between the claim that there are many values and the 
claim that one value is more important than the rest, playing the role of a gateway good. 
Besides, this thesis certainly cannot be classified as value monism, real or apparent. 
STUDENT: Let me pose it in the following way: the value pluralism that you seem to 
defend is reductive value pluralism. Indeterminacy and genuine normative disagreement 
does not emerge or is kept to a minimum. But the interesting variation of the position of 
value pluralism is certainly non-reductive pluralism: values can be in conflict in an 
irreducible manner. Think of the decision making processes of an individual agent 
experiencing normative uncertainty. When a reflective agent attempts to choose between 
equally compelling, but conflicting and even apparently irreconcilable ends, what the 
agent typically confronts is the fundamental plurality and diversity of ends
26
. The 
interesting feature of these cases is that indeterminacy is allowed with respect to what 
ought to be done, something that ipso facto underwrites the legitimacy of normative 
disagreement. 
PETTIT: But this exactly fits my republican conception: it is a further, strong argument 






STUDENT: Not quite so! In the republican conception there is a clear limit to the scope 
of the application of the democratic method: the contestatory model deals only with the 
disagreement on how to entrench freedom as non-domination in the public institutions, 
and does not aim at enabling choices among diverse, possibly irreconcilable and in any 
case non-reductive values. In a real world setting, which is the setting of a non-reductive 
pluralism, a trade-off among these values must take place and reasonable choices must be 
made. To put it in yet other, simpler terms: there is nothing that guarantees that the 
establishment of liberty in a polity will necessarily lead to the emergence and prevalence 
of peace, prosperity, justice, efficiency or material equality. 
PETTIT: Hold on! I admit that there is a lot of empirical work to be done in establishing 
the links between the entrenchment of liberty and the entrenchment of the other values. 
Let me repeat that my claim does not primarily concern ideal theory, but concrete 
institutional realities. If freedom as non-domination is constituted in the respective 
institutional reality along the lines that I have indicated before, then this concrete 
institutional reality will appeal to citizens also in many other ways. 
STUDENT: I think that you are wrong on this. Citizens permanently evaluate 
institutional realities with respect to different values. And they choose an institutional 
reality over another not only according to one value. The fact that citizens choose to exit 
a country and go somewhere else, say when citizens of other countries choose to live in a 
country of the Western world as is currently the case, is because they judge institutional 
realities of the polities in the West as they constitute a long series of values to a greater or 
lesser degree: freedom, justice, security and prosperity. That all good things must be 
compatible with one another and therefore capable of being realized simultaneously is 
simply false. Have we not agreed before that ideals must be transformed into concrete 
alternatives if they are to be taken into serious consideration politically? 
PETTIT: Yes, we have. 
STUDENT: My point is that each and every political action represents an intervention in 
a structured social situation – there is, in other words, always an institutional a priori that 









PETTIT: I do not deny this, of course. 
STUDENT: I plead therefore for focusing even more on a comparative institutional 
approach rather than on a transcendental approach, as Sen somehow misleadingly called 
it 
28
, referring to Rawls's theory of justice
29
. Instead of identifying a perfect societal 
arrangement, the ideal of republican polity in your case, and trying to work out 
institutional structures in order to come closer to this ideal, a comparative approach might 
indeed be preferable. To illustrate the contrast involved, it may well be that abolishing the 
rule in certain Islamic countries that women must always be escorted by men in the 
public domain, will yield an advancement of their liberty. The implementation of such a 
policy could still leave the society involved largely unfree, nevertheless. Would you deny 
this? 
PETTIT: No. But… 
STUDENT: Please allow me to go on. 
PETTIT: Sure. 
STUDENT: Now, the great advantage of a comparative approach is that it is compatible 
with accepting plural, non-reductive values and their entrenchment in institutional 
arrangements. Besides, the comparative approach encapsulates the requirements of 
critical reason. We always find ourselves in an institutional a priori whenever political 
praxis is required. In other words, the construction of alternative solutions always occurs 
in the context of already existing solutions, whereby one always has to acknowledge that 
the existing solutions themselves are already a product of cultural evolution. Every time 
that a solution to a new problem is required, it is to be borne in mind that a body of 
solutions to problems of the same or similar type already exists, which has arisen in an 
evolutionary process of collective learning. Depending on the problem in question, the 
available pool of solutions can make it easier or more difficult to find a solution. It 





political realm, this means that there are no presuppositionless solutions to problems, but 
that each and every political action is undertaken in a more or less strongly structured 
situation. The exertion of critical rationality in political praxis ensures that traditional 
solutions that have been handed down are not necessarily to be accepted; yet, it does not 
preclude that they perhaps best fulfill the accepted values and criteria, and given that they 
have stood the test of time they at times may very well be the best available solutions. 
PETTIT: I agree, of course, with that and my republican conception of democracy 
endorses this view to a great degree. A central requirement of contestatory democracy is 
that many issues should be heard away from the tumult of popular discussion and away, 
even, from the theatre of parliamentary debate. In many cases, democracy requires 
recourse to the relative quiet of the parliamentary, cross-party committee, or the formal 
bureaucratic inquiry, or the standing appeals board, or the quasi-judicial tribunal, or the 
autonomous, professionalized body. This lesson has been learnt in relation to at least 
some issues: witness the independence usually enjoyed, for example, by central banks. 
But it has not been learned on nearly enough fronts, and a republican philosophy would 
call for a radical examination of current practice. 
STUDENT: What you suggest is correct and important, but still limited to democratic 
procedures. I want to stress the general role of tradition of rules of conduct inherited to 
every generation from the past in the process of cultural evolution. Thus, we can always 
examine a part of the whole "only in terms of that whole which we cannot entirely 
reconstruct and the greater part of which we must accept unexamined"
30
. Our criticism 
aiming at improvement of our rules can and must proceed within a given system of such 
rules. We can only reform parts of a given whole, but never entirely redesign it
31
. Critical 
reason is all that we avail of in order to improve our rules, although there are limits to it. 
PETTIT: I disagree with that. For me, the notion of democracy has an important primacy. 
No text and no tradition is more important than the precipitates of the local democratic 
process. If the institutions that are selected under the development of that process are 
ruled out by reference to such an impersonal authority, then the polity is not effectively 
tracking people's interests and ideas. The claim that the democratic process is the last 





have in populist circles; the process envisaged is essentially one of contestation, after all, 
not one that necessarily involves majority decision-making. There is no suggestion that 
the people in some collective incarnation, or via some collective representation, are 
voluntaristically supreme. Under the contestatory image, the democratic process is 
designed to let the requirements of reason materialize and impose themselves; it is not a 
process that gives any particular place to will. 
STUDENT: I see that tradition is unimportant for you and that it is primarily the 
democratic process that lets the requirements of reason materialize and impose 
themselves, as you put it. But this is least convincing. 
PETTIT: Well, tradition does play a role, but only within the conception of a contestatory 
democracy. The republican image, at least in the form it assumed in the English-speaking 
world, tended to lay great stress on the fact that certain laws were tried and tested over a 
long history of challenge: they were part of an ancient and venerable constitution of 
freedom. This emphasis on the attractions of well-tested, long-tested law makes sense in 
terms of my conception of democracy. For what is important under that conception is 
precisely that democracy provides an environment for the selection of laws which ensures 
that survivors are generally satisfactory; to the extent that survivors have proved capable 
of withstanding the contestations made against them, they may be presumed to answer to 
the interests and ideas of people at large. The main contrast between the conception of 
democracy in which the central notion is contestability and the standard, consent-centered 
conceptions is precisely that mine relies on a process of selection whereas those 
conceptions rely on a process of design.  
STUDENT: Our views really differ at this point. When one stresses the importance of 
cultural evolution, as I do, concrete forms and ideals of political regimes, like your – 
dynamic – ideal republican polity, are integrated into a more global process of collective 
learning
32
. If we admit the fallibility of all our knowledge and institutions, then their 
advancement presupposes that we leave room for a continuous revision of our present 
ideals, the republican ideal included. Contestatory democracy is certainly not the last 







PETTIT: I am a democrat through and through. The primacy of contestatory democracy 
is quasi-absolute in my view. 
STUDENT: One of the dangers of adopting such a view is sliding into populism, of 
course. You have referred to it before, but seemed not to recognize the magnitude of this 
danger. When even the longest-tested solutions of ours in the form of the most general 
rules forming our constitutional culture - and possibly also embedded in written 
constitutions - are not to be accepted without question, but are set as an object of debate 
and decision by an ephemeral majority, populism not only knocks on the door, but is 
already sitting in the living-room. I do not want that the abolition of slavery, the 
prohibition of folter, universal suffrage or the equal treatment of men and women form 
part of a democratic agenda, even an ideal republican one. 
PETTIT: Nobody wants this. 
STUDENT: But your republican conception allows this. As it allows very deep 
interventions in the market process on the part of the government in order to secure all 
citizens functioning capabilities. For how can the goods that you wish to be granted to 
everybody in a republican polity, like social, medical and judicial security, even financial 
security, be provided by any other way as by heavy taxation? And… 
PETTIT: But taxation is an essential aspect of any property system, distinguishing it from 
any sort of theft… 
STUDENT: But the extent of taxation will be huge in order to sustain all these goods that 
the republican ideal requires. 
PETTIT: But I haven't pleaded for strict material equality, but merely of equality of 
status, operationalized by the eyeball test, I remind you. 
STUDENT: But in order to maintain the equality of status that you envision, the 
government has to be turned into a vast redistributional machine with the known dangers. 
Is this what you wish for? Besides, and independently of the arguments that the theory of 
public choice has produced over the last fifty years questioning the efficiency of turning 





unanswered: why is it moral that a collective agent like a government takes away the 
property of the wealthier members of a society and give it to the poorer? Whenever you 
take something away from an individual using organized violence, you must have a good 
moral argument. What is your argument? 
PETTIT: Suppose that you have fewer resources and protections than your neighbour and 
that we, acting for the state, have a choice between conferring more on you or conferring 
more on the neighbour; the choice may arise with providing services, delivering subsidies 
or imposing taxes. If we invest in the neighbour rather than investing in you, then we are 
likely to do relatively well less in guarding against domination, since you are in more 
danger of domination and so more likely to be in a position to benefit from the extra 
investment. And if we invest in the neighbour rather than investing in you, then we are 
likely to worsen the danger of domination in absolute terms, since the neighbour is more 
likely to be enabled by the extra investment to dominate you or others. 
The first of these effects means that investing resources or protections in the better off 
has diminishing marginal productivity; as it targets the better and better off, it is less and 
less likely to be productive – that is, less and less likely to increase non-domination. And 
the second of the effects means that such investment also has increasing marginal 
counter-productivity – that is, more and more likely to increase domination. The effects 
combine to give us reason for thinking that if the state seeks to promote equal freedom as 
non-domination – that is, to make the status of free citizenship available to all – then it 
will be systematically programmed to reduce material inequalities in people's resources 
and protections. 
STUDENT: I am very surprised that you are proposing such an argument! First of all, the 
case for the diminishing marginal productivity of every dollar of an investment (in any 
project) is an argument in terms of utilities in effect, and I thought that you are not a 
utilitarian! What you propose is essentially nothing else than an application of welfare 
economics of the old type, before its Paretian reformulation that is, to the issue at hand. 
Now, the issue at hand is non-domination, of course, and a further puzzle to me is how 
utility considerations are to be applied on non-domination, as if it were a regular "good". 





gateway good, but now you suddenly seem to regard utility as the fundamental value – 
something that you consistently rejected during our conversation. Finally, and most 
importantly perhaps, you have phrased your argument in terms of a "state" undertaking 
some "investment". The pronouncement of such a fiction of an omniscient, omnipotent 
and good social planner of welfare economics by you was something that I could never 
expect. There is no such a thing and the functioning of a real polity has nothing to do 
with such dangerous fictions. There are always real human beings, politicians and 
administrators, who will do the redistribution, no fictional "state" engaging in 
"investments". 
PETTIT: This is a harsh criticism that I do not accept! I am not a utilitarian and the 
marginal productivity argument is a general argument, applicable to a wide range of 
issues. 
STUDENT: That you do not accept this critique of mine has to do, I think, with a specific 
view of yours on how politics and markets interrelate and on how markets work. It is 
certainly not the case that any kind of intervention in markets is plausible and defensible 
only because it harmonizes with your preferred republican ideal. The market is not an 
organization. Neither is it a simple mechanism merely aggregating individual 
preferences. This is a fundamentally erroneous picture conveyed by mainstream 
neoclassical microeconomic theory. Since the marginalist revolution, microeconomic 
theory has concentrated on economic decisions and acts of choice in order to explain 
exchange, prices and the allocation of resources. This neoclassical analysis, even in its 
current game-theoretic form
34
, only partially explains real market occurrences, however. 
It fails to recognize or it unduly simplifies the central role of innovation and imitation 
processes, and, accordingly, innovative knowledge. Markets are arenas where knowledge 
creation and knowledge diffusion permanently occurs, along, of course, with the 
allocation of resources. And markets always work within an institutional framework. 






STUDENT: The dominant research program of economics, the social science that is 
supposed to focus mainly on the functioning of markets, that is, neoclassical economics, 
does thoroughly neglect the role of rules in the market process! This abstraction from the 
institutional framework within which every exchange process takes place is justified by 
the proponents of the neoclassical research program by their conscious attempt to provide 
exact economic laws that are, in turn, supposed to explain how a society overcomes the 
ubiquitous phenomenon of scarcity. The market is mainly viewed as an allocating 
machine that solves the main problems of society, that is, what to produce, how, and for 
whom. The solution to these problems occurs simultaneously whenever agents, who are 
assumed to maximize their utility, exhaust all the exchange possibilities. This is 
formalized in the concept of a general equilibrium. In this model, no institutional analysis 
seems necessary mainly because the real-world social context is eliminated and thereby 
gives place to a pure "universum of commodities"
35
. 
PETTIT: Be that as it may, the main issue from a republican point of view is that markets 
- independently on whether they are the arenas of knowledge-creation and diffusion or of 
resource allocation or of both – can certainly very often serve to increase domination and 
this is something unacceptable for a republican. 
STUDENT: This is certainly the case. But only if one endorses the view that markets 
always work within rules and that market competition is an evolutionary process, can the 
problem of domination in markets be appropriately treated. This is in fact a big lacuna in 
the republican tradition: there is a lack of an analysis of market exchange which is 
somehow supposed to "run" automatically and deliver all the good things that the 
political sphere requires from it. The market setting is, next to the political setting, the 
other major domain of social interaction which must be appropriately theorized upon and 
normatively appraised. 
PETTIT: I agree. 
STUDENT: The market is an arena where human creativity is exemplified, an open-
ended process where novel solutions are permanently tried out. It is creative, diverse and 





fuel selection. The market is not a means towards an accomplishment of any known ends. 
In this it crucially differs from an organization or corporate actor, that is, a group of 
individuals bound by some rules designed to achieve a common objective. An 
organization or corporate actor is a collective unit characterized by a set of procedural 
rules that define the coordination of the individual members who have pooled their 
resources for a joint purpose
36
. A market, on the contrary, is the institutional embodiment 
of exchange relationships in which individuals engage themselves while following their 
own, diverse aims. The rules that structure these exchange relationships are 
fundamentally different from the rules that structure an organization, in being abstract, 
general and end-independent. 
The market interaction of individuals gives rise to the spontaneous emergence of prices 
who can coordinate the millions of plans of market participants. The price system makes 
use of the knowledge of the members of the society more efficiently than any other 
known institutional arrangement. An efficient allocation of resources, that is an allocation 
of resources to the uses that are more urgently needed, is an important outcome of the 
functioning of a price system. An efficient outcome is not to be judged as such in 
comparison to any ideal, non-existent setting, but in comparison to real-world settings, 
for example, the central planning of economic activity organized by a socialist state. 
Besides, the market process also gives rise to new technologies that improve the 
productive methods of the given society and increases its prosperity. Finally, an 
inequality of income distribution is also an outcome of the functioning of markets, judged 
according to standards developed outside the market process itself. 
But there is nothing automatic in markets generating knowledge coordination and 
knowledge creation in a manner which will lead to increased prosperity, allocational 
efficiency and the rest. This depends exclusively on the appropriate general rules being in 
place which will allow such knowledge-creation processes to unfold. The fundamental 
insight is that the same individuals with the same skills and motivations will interact to 
generate quite different aggregate outcomes under different sets of rules, something that 







PETTIT: So, everything hinges on the level of rules, the institutions – if I may interrupt 
your enthusiastic account of the market process! 
STUDENT: Indeed. To repeat: there is no automatism, no iron economic law that will 
force market powers to coordinate the knowledge of market participants, allocate the 
resources according to the uses that are most urgent, foster innovation and increase 
productivity, and affect the material well-being of everyone in a predetermined manner. 
The historical experience of the central planning in socialist regimes in the 20th century 
has taught us that such rules can be established that market exchange disappears 
altogether or is limited to a minimum – "the black market". The historical experience of 
the 19th century has shown that rules that are permissive of cartels, trusts and permanent 
monopolies can lead to the vanishing of competition in the market – a development 
which leads to inefficient resource allocation, reduces innovative activity, decreases 
productivity… 
PETTIT: …and most important of all, allows a huge increase of private power for the 
wealthy individuals and corporations. 
STUDENT: Exactly. Here lies according to my view the heart of the matter: what kind of 
institutions are to be consciously set or allowed to prevail so that neither government 
power nor private power becomes excessive. In a setting of a central economic planning 
the appropriation of power becomes in fact colossal: a group of people availing of the 
monopoly in the use of violence additionally avails of the power to impose on every 
member of a society its will about the choice of profession, employment and 
remuneration for the supplied labour. The increase of domination on the part of the 
government is immense in such a setting. 
PETTIT: No doubt, the loss of individual freedom is huge in a socialist state where 
economic activity is centrally planned. 
STUDENT: When the institutional framework of a market process is very permissive, 
however, an agglomeration of private economic power will be the result. Laissez-faire 
economic liberals consistently underestimate this danger, and believe that markets should 





framework should systematically favor business interests. Now, entrepreneurs cause the 
endogenous transition of market structures in a process of creative destruction as 
Schumpeter pointedly described it
38
. Competition is a process of "moves and 
responses"
39
, an innovation-imitation process
40
. The temporary creation of market power 
positions through innovation is a component of the competitive process, and short-run 
monopoly profits are important stimuli to innovation, without which the entire process 
would come to a standstill. Market competition leads, thus, to a permanent forming, 
shifting and erosion of market power
41
. However, market and competition are two 
distinct phenomena. There is no necessity that competition will always prevail in 
markets. The contrary is the case, as the historical record shows. And it took centuries to 
collectively learn that the institutional framework should be amended so that competitive 
markets emerge and are sustained – and private economic power thus effectively limited. 
Antitrust legislation was born, an important North American invention. 
PETTIT: Which one do you have in mind? 
STUDENT: Canada passed a Dominion antitrust statute in 1889, and the United States 
adopted the Sherman Act in 1890 which declared trusts illegal and outlawed 
monopolization of trade and attempts to monopolize. That the problem of combatting 
excessive economic power was the target of the new legislation is evident in the phrase of 
Senator Sherman expressed during the debate in the Senate before passing the Act named 
after him: "If we will not endure a king as a political power we should not endure a king 
over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life. If we would 
not submit to an emperor we should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to 
prevent competition and to fix the price of any commodity"
42
. 
The German history is especially illuminating for our case. The Reichsgericht (Royal 
Court) in its famous decision of February 4, 1897 has granted a permission to the 
"Sächsischer – Holzstoffabrikantenverband" to build a cartel. The court decided that the 
freedom to build a cartel was part of the freedom to form a contract – Vertragsfreiheit 
was judged to include Kartellfreiheit. This has led to the emergence of 385 cartels in 
1905
43
 and about 3000 in the year 1925
44
. Germany had become the Land der Kartelle 





and under the influence of the Allies, that the first antitrust legislation was enacted in 
West Germany – the "Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen" (GWB). 
PETTIT: This is very interesting. 
STUDENT: The case of antitrust legislation exemplifies, I hope, the thrust of my 
argument. The passing of the Sherman Act in 1890, the decision of the Reichsgericht in 
1897 and the passing of GWB in 1958 in Germany were all problem solving attempts of a 
local character. They were local decisions which have produced global outcomes in a 
long process, the most important being that nearly every country in the world today, with 
only a few exceptions, has antitrust laws. Introducing and changing such laws is a tedious 
process involving making two steps forward and one step back. If we want to judge as 
reasonable the choices of introducing the Sherman Act and the GWB juxtaposing these 
choices to the decision of the Reichsgericht, we have an exemplification of the rationality 
of rules as they evolve. What seemed like minor changes in the rules, have had a huge 
impact solving to a great degree the problem of private economic power by legally 
imposing on every market participant the discipline of competition. "[Die] Konkurrenz 
[ist] das großartigste und genialste Entmachtungsinstrument der Geschichte" was the 
verdict of Franz Böhm, the co-founder of the Freiburg School in Germany: "Competition 




PETTIT: Microsoft, Google and the other hugely influential corporations of the modern 
global markets must fear the sanctions of the antitrust laws for their anti-competitive 
practices. I agree. But, whom do they fear? Government agencies, national and supra-
national, like the European Commission. 
STUDENT: Imagine how different the global market would look like, if antitrust 
legislation were absent. And it is important to stress, of course, that this legislation covers 
a series of business practices like cartel-building, predatory pricing, monopolization etc. 
which intend to switch off competition. We are not talking about problems of fraud and 
corruption like, for example, the cases of Siemens or Volkswagen, which are solved by 





of keeping the right equilibrium of public and private power. The government is needed 
to enforce antitrust and the other kinds of economic legislation, so that the accumulation 
of private power - which is inevitable and desirable to a certain degree in an evolutionary 
market where innovations constantly take place - remains restricted. But government's 
power to set and sustain the institutional framework should also be limited. The market is 
an arena of freedom – this is something that is not always recognized and cannot be 
stressed enough. The crucial difference is that even when corporations become very 
wealthy and influential, they do not avail of the means and legitimacy to exert physical 
violence, at least not directly and systematically. Politics, on the contrary, is primarily the 
arena where groups of people lay claim to the legitimate use of physical force for 
themselves
46
, so that freedom is ipso facto endangered more than in markets. When 
looking for the appropriate equilibrium between public and private power, this must 
always be kept in mind. 
PETTIT: This is an important thought, though historically, of course, private economic 
power has been so huge that it could very well avail of means of production of violence 
applied to further increase of its influence: just think of the case of Belgian Congo, for 
example… 
STUDENT: … and the ruthless system of economic exploitation of the indigenous 
Congolese by Leopold's Congo Free State. There is nothing automatic in attaining the 
appropriate equilibrium between private and public power – this is what Congo and 
countless other historical examples show.  
PETTIT: Eternal vigilance is required to keep accumulation of power limited and 
freedom as non-domination alive. And one should always keep in mind that although 
markets are hugely important in social life, people in the modern world mainly interact 
within organizations. An elaborate account of group agency is required to understand 
organizational behavior, something that I have been thinking about a lot lately. 
STUDENT: Securing non-domination in organizations is also very important. I can see 
that it can take very different forms in economic organizations like corporations, political 





as in all other social arenas, the general rules arranging social interaction within 
organizations will embed many different values, not only freedom, I think. The general 
point is that every given institutional arrangement will encapsulate the solutions to the 
problems that have emerged in the environment of social groups as they have evolved 
spontaneously in a long historical process. This institutional framework will be further 
amended by new decisions in a never ending process of the human endeavour to cope 
with new problems in a non-ergodic world. Our task cannot be to simply accept the given 
institutional framework, because it embeds the accumulated knowledge of the past, 
however. This would be a fatalistic stance. Why should we simply accept the outcomes of 
the process of cultural evolution? 
PETTIT: We should not. 
STUDENT: But then, what is at our disposal in our efforts to amend and improve them? 
Reason. But what we call "reason" or "rationality" comes through in the mind and in the 
institutions; it has an individual and a collective manifestation. The fundamental issue is 
that reason in its critical and constructive function evolves among two mirrors, the mind 
of the individual and the rules and institutions that it has created. We must acknowledge 
that both in theory and in praxis reason is not only in the mind, but also in the world. It is 
neither completely autonomous nor completely heteronomous. It is neither omnipotent 
nor powerless. It is in any case all that we have to improve our condition. 
JOHN GOICURIA: Please, excuse my interruption. Professor Pettit, the President is back 
in town and … 
PRESIDENT: Philip, good to see you! 
PETTIT: Very nice to see you. I have a guest from Europe, so I have asked to get the 
president's table not knowing you are in town. I hope you don't mind! 
PRESIDENT: Of course not! I can easily sit at another table. And my apologies for 
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